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National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran Undermines Bush-Cheney' Claims and Intentions

December 7, 2007

JOE MILLER

Below find links to the comments of Carah Ong (1), Trita Parsi (2), and Ray McGovern (3) on the implications of the December 3 release of the declassified portions of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran. All agree that the NIE totally undermines (at least in a fact-based, reality-oriented world) attempts by Cheney, Bush and their allies to justify an attack on Iran to preempt the nuclear weapons programs they alleged Iran was pursuing. McGovern and Ong offer insights into why the declassified portions of the NIE were released, and McGovern describes how even the declassified portions were almost not released. All agree that the NIE provides an exceptionally strong argument for diplomacy with Iran. The fourth article by Gareth Porter (4) reinforces this argument, and suggests that diplomacy by Britain, France and Germany with Iran in 2003 and 2004 may have contributed to an Iranian decision to halt nuclear weapons-related work.

  1. Carah Ong: New Intelligence Estimate Calls for Credible Diplomatic Option to Extend Iran's Nuclear Weapons Halt 12/4/07
    http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4789
  2. Trita Parsi: Bush Iran Stance Ignores Reality,Says Iran Scholar 12/4/07
    http://www.commondreams.org/news2007/1204-11.htm
  3. Ray McGovern: Fact-Based Intelligence Prevails on Nukes and Iran 12/3/07
    http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/12/03/5590/
  4. Gareth Porter: Iran NIE Validates 2003 European Diplomacy 12/4/07
    http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=40338

Below also find links to an article by Gareth Porter (5) and a blog post by Scott Horton (6) describing how Cheney did his best for the last year to stifle dissent within, force revisions of, and suppress the release of the NIE.

  1. Gareth Porter: Cheney Tried to Stifle Dissent in Iran NIE 11/9/07
    http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/11/09/5117/
  2. Scott Horton: "The Roll-Out Goes Flat" 12/3/07
    http://harpers.org/archive/2007/12/hbc-90001837

We're now if for a period of intensive neocon spin about how the NIE actually demonstrates the correctness of everything Bush, Cheney and their allies have advocated, as well as an attempt to find alternative justifications" for attacking Iran, e.g., alleged direct Iranian support (training, arming, advising) for attacks against US forces in Iraq. Below find two articles by Gareth Porter (7, 8) about the validity of these alternative "justifications."

  1. Gareth Porter: How Cheney Cooked the Intelligence on Iran 11/9/07
    http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-gareth-porter/how-cheney-cooked-the-int_b_72008.html
  2. Gareth Porter: Lieberman-Kyl vs. the Evidence 9/26/07
    http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-gareth-porter/liebermankyl-vs-the-evi_b_66020.html

Update

Below find articles by Haroon Siddiqui (9), Dilip Hiro (10; with an introduction by Tom Engelhardt, and links to comments by Jim Lobe and Seymour Hersh), and Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball (11) that provide important updates on the major ways in which the NIE on Iran undermines the claims and intentions of Bush, Cheney and their allies.

  1. Haroon Siddiqui: Speaking Truth to Power on Iran 12/6/07
    http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/12/06/5659/
  2. Tom Engelhardt: Dilip Hiro, Bush's Losing Iranian Hand 12/6/07
    http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/174871/dilip_hiro_bush_s_losing_iranian_hand
  3. Michael Isikoff & Mark Hosenball: Anatomy of a Turnabout 12/5/07
    http://www.newsweek.com/id/73904

Some neocons (e.g., John Bolton) have suggested that the 16 agencies contributing to the NIE may have been duped by Iranian disinformation. Here's Isikoff and Hosenball's (11) closing paragraph on this possibility:

"However, U.S. intelligence officials said that while an Iranian disinformation effort was possible, they believe that their conclusions were not influenced by Iranian disinformation. Indeed, officials said, the underlying intelligence information that went into the NIE was carefully vetted by "red teams" of analysts and counterintelligence officers for possible Iranian deceptions, but stood up to this intense vetting. "We did turn it over to our CI [counterintelligence] folks and said, 'What do you think? Could this be a strategic deception?'" one senior intelligence official said, adding, "I think the overall judgment is that is plausible but not likely, and the overall assessment of the community is contained in the words you see in the key judgments: high confidence, high confidence, high confidence."

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Joseph Miller
Department of Psychology
51 Madeleva
Saint Mary's College
Notre Dame, IN 46556

St. Joe Valley Greens, South Bend, IN